Arab Spring: Early Warning Failure

The United States’ system for detecting an early warning with collected intelligence failed in the case of the Arab Spring. There was room to believe the United States’ may have known or should have known the Arab Spring was coming based on the intelligence they possessed. For instance, Dreyfuss reveals the United States had reason to suspect an uprising as per a classified White House staff report from August 2010 which specified that “Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Yemen were ripe for upheaval.” (Dreyfuss 2011, 43).        

This intelligence failure concerns a defect in the United States’ early warning system. Paul Stares argues it was impossible for the United States to detect an early warning in this case because there was no “regular and systematic process” of analyzing long-term based intelligence. While the United States possibly had reason to know of the uprising, they failed to recognize the signals illustrated by either ignorance or disregard for intelligence in the August 2010 report. Additionally, the lack of an early warning caused the United States to be unaware of the climate in the Arab World and to be subsequently unprepared to respond. (Business Source Elite 2011, 4). Altogether, the United States must improve its analysis regarding its early warning system.

There are various ways in which the United States can improve its early warning system in the context of analysis. For instance, the United States needs to be able to identify risks that may not exist yet but are potential threats down the road. (Business Source Elite 2011, 5). In doing so, the United States needs to improve on:

• (1) Understanding the Importance of Long-Term Intelligence,
• (2) Understanding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring,
• (3) Understanding the Role of Psychology in Intelligence Analysis, and
• (4) Understanding the Role of Social Media in Intelligence Analysis.

By improving its capabilities in all four areas, the United States will be better equipped to predict and to respond to events unfolding in the Middle East.

Understanding the Importance of Long-Term Intelligence

The United States needs to detect future events by analyzing intelligence in the long-term rather than merely in the short-term. While the U.S. utilizes short-term based intelligence collection to produce an early warning, the Arab Spring is an example of what could have been predicted using intelligence to predict events over the long-term to produce early. (Business Source Elite 2011, 4-5). An early warning can be detected by both short-term and long-term intelligence; long-term intelligence merely requires the analysis of multiple pieces of short-term intelligence.

Analyzing for surprises or the unknown is essential in intelligence. Using Grabo’s logic, an analyst must consider all the alternatives to overcome surprises planned by the enemy. (Grabo 2004, 36). In the context of the Arab Spring, an intelligence analyst:

• Needs to also detect those surprises planned or unplanned by the populations. 
• Needs to understand the subject of intelligence may not fall within the traditional notion of an enemy.
• Must broaden their idea of what can be the subject of intelligence analysis; in addition to a country, the subject can be anything and anybody.

As the Arab Spring has shown us, “surprise” remains an obstacle for the United States’ intelligence community in terms of both collection and analysis. In order to overcome this setback, the United States must consider intelligence in the long-term by entertaining analysis of various scenarios and subjects.

Understanding the Dynamics of the Arab Spring

It was difficult to assess to what extent the United States should have known Arab Spring was going to happen. Part of the difficulty in answering this question may be explained by how Dreyfuss described the Arab Spring as a three-dimensional phenomenon involving “social, political and economic” factors. (Dreyfuss 2011, 43). Rather than concentrate on one predominant concern such as terrorism and politics, the U.S. intelligence community needs to widen its perception to take into consideration anything contributing to society, economics, and politics. A three-dimensional mindset may be the key to minimizing the risks of an intelligence failure similar to that of the Arab Spring.

By understanding the sentiments behind the Arab Spring, the intelligence community may recognize where it went wrong. Business Middle East acknowledged two related causes:

• (1) “the accumulation of private wealth by individuals with public clout,” and
• (2) “the state’s inability to continue to provide jobs and subsidized living for their fast-growing populations.” (Business Middle East 2011, 1).

Economics was a significant issue for the protestors in the Middle East who shared a parallel struggle to find work and to take care of themselves. The United States must acknowledge the economic circumstances of the people when analyzing threats originating from a region.

 Moreover, the United States needs to consider how alternative, but related, factors contributed to the Arab Spring. Johnstone and Mazo (2011) reveal the following about global warming:

• Played a role, possibly only minor, in the hostile climate in the Arab World. (11).
• Explained why people throughout the Middle East paid more for food. (11).
• Acted as an indirect factor considering the amount of imported food was highest among the Middle East and North Africa countries. (13).  

Indeed, there remained room to reason that global warming and the food crisis act as “threat multiplier[s].” (Johnstone and Mazo 2011, 15). These multipliers elaborated on the extent economics explains the Arab Spring. As Johnstone and Mazo concluded, “global warming may not have caused the Arab Spring, but it may have made it come earlier.” (Johnstone and Mazo 2011, 16).

The connection between global warming and the regional food crisis should not have been ignored by intelligence analysts. Some experts including World Bank President Robert Zoellick acknowledged the food crisis as an “aggravating factor” in causing the Arab Spring. (Johnstone and Mazo 2011, 13). On the other hand, others like FAO senior economist Abdolreza Abbassian felt this was an exaggeration of the escalating prices in food. (Johnstone and Mazo 2011, 14). Such issues, whether direct or indirect factors, must be considered in isolation and collectively by intelligence analysts.

Understanding the Role of Psychology in Intelligence Analysis

The United States should utilize alternative theories in psychology to enhance its analysis. Political Science Professor Elif Erisen argues researching aspects of psychology as it relates to politics and public opinion is beneficial to study the underlying causes of the Arab Spring. (Erisen 2012, 23). Psychology research as part of the analysis process would have been highly beneficial to the United States in order to avoid the intelligence failure associated with the Arab Spring.

Analysts could have employed various theories in psychology to possibly predict the Arab Spring before it actually occurred. Using Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory, Murray (2012) finds elements of “permeability, illegitimacy, and the ability to envisage cognitive alternatives” explaining how the Arab Spring came about. Because the government was resistant to the people, the civilians formed a collective group to make their lives better. (Murray 2012, 59). Corruption explains why the people were fighting the government. (Murray 2012, 59). When people see a better alternative, they will seek it. (Murray 2012, 59). Overall, Henri Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory explains why the protestors revolted throughout the Middle East. (Murray 2012, 59).  If the United States utilized such psychology theories when analyzing intelligence, analysts may have predicted a revolution was possible in the region by considering alternative scenarios. 

Understanding the Role of Social Media in Intelligence Analysis

Canadian sociologist Phillip N. Howard points out that social media influenced the explosion of uprisings throughout the Middle East and was continuing to play a role as it unfolded (Murray 2012, 61). By looking at the social media at the time preceding the uprisings, there was evidence that there was increased communication regarding the political change on social media sites like Twitter. (Murray 2012, 61). According to journalist Carol Huang, Facebook was the media of choice for approximately 9/10 protestors in Egypt and Tunisia. (Huang 2011, 1). Academics associate various social media outlets with the regime collapses and the movements to improve sociopolitical conditions throughout the countries experiencing the Arab Spring. (Stepanova 2011, 1). 

There also appears to be a link between the events in Egypt with the subsequent events in Tunisia because social media acted as a means to communicate about the protests between the two countries. (Stepanova 2011, 1).  Indeed, crowds tend to have a hypnotic effect on people that results in conformity. (Murray 2012, 61). With this theory in mind, social media acted like a crowd in influencing people to rebel based on a desire to conform to suggested behavior. 

An alternative reason for this conforming behavior was inspiration from the communication on social media because they shared the same sentiment with their Muslim brothers and sisters. Social media merely managed to convey the shared sentiment much easier than traditional ways of communication between civilians in Middle Eastern countries such as newspapers and television news outlets which may not objectively convey the message. This theory helps explain why social media became such an important tool in influencing conformity amongst civilians and why social media is the link between uprisings in two countries.

While social media proves essential to assisting in a revolution in modern times, it also becomes a vital tool for the intelligence community in analyzing the political climate in the Arab world. With the power of social media to influence a subsequent uprising as it did in Tunisia, the Intelligence community should embrace open source intelligence in collecting data regarding various aspects of the Arab world including the sociopolitical environment.

Stepanova (2011) acknowledges there are risks of social media outlooks in disseminating “Western democratic values [because] this approach ignores the socioeconomic and social justice and equality dimensions of the mass protests in the Arab World.” (Stepanova 2011, 6). This phenomenon reveals how social media is more about using less violence rather than predominantly promoting democracy. (Stepanova 2011, 6). Because there are a variety of issues underlying the Arab Spring, intelligence analysts need to analyze each one.

Conclusion

Arab Spring revealed the United States must improve its ability to analyze intelligence regarding the Middle East. At one point, the United States’ IC was experiencing a decrease in information flow from the intelligence agencies of its Arab allies. (Blanche 2011, 31). When the Arab Spring started unfolding, the United States found itself shut off from the source. (Blanche 2011, 32). Blanche (2011) points out the Middle Eastern leaders ousted from power backed the United States and thus, that support disappeared by their overthrow. (Blanche 2011, 32). Arab Spring was a momentous blow to the U.S. intelligence community.

To further elaborate, Arab Spring created various national security concerns for the United States. In addition to Egypt’s intelligence chief General Omar Suleiman distancing himself from the U.S. after Mubarak was forced from power in Egypt, the new government developing in Egypt has also cut ties with Israel, a step back since the 1979 peace treaty. (Blanche 2011, 33).

In conclusion, Arab Spring proved the United States needed to improve its ability to analyze intelligence regarding the Middle East to avoid future errors in perception by:

• Utilizing intelligence sources for long-term as well as short-term predictions.
• Incorporating psychological theories into its analysis.
• Paying attention to the power and influence of social media.

Acknowledging the benefits of utilizing each of these standards will enhance the IC’s ability to analyze intelligence and ensure national security.

Photo by Ash from Modern Afflatus on Unsplash

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